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We study the role of reciprocity in a labor market field experiment. In a recent paper, 
Gneezy and List (2006) investigate the impact of gift exchange in this context and find that it 
has only a transient effect on long run outcomes. Extending their work to examine both 
positive and negative reciprocity, we find consonant evidence in the positive reciprocity 
condition: the gift does not work well in the long run (if at all). Yet, in the negative 
reciprocity treatment we observe much stronger effects: a wage reduction has a significant 
and lasting negative impact on efforts. Together, these results highlight the asymmetry of 
positive and negative reciprocity that exists in the field, and provide an indication of the  
relative importance of each in the long run. 
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 1 Introduction
Reciprocal motivations are probably the most prominent explanation for the
hypothesis of e￿ciency wages and the associated phenomenon of involuntary
unemployment in equilibrium (see Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1988,
1990)). An impressive amount of lab experimental evidence underpins the
role of reciprocity1 in labor market relationships. In Fehr et al. (1993)’s classic
gift exchange experiment, a principal can pay a wage to an agent, who in turn
exerts costly e￿ort that generates a payo￿ for the principal. They observe a
positive wage-e￿ort relationship: paying above-minimum wages (i.e. sharing
part of the pro￿ts) is perceived as kind and rewarded by a high e￿ort of
the worker. Hence, reciprocity seems to be able to mitigate enforcement
problems of incomplete contracts (see Fehr et al. (1997)). Moreover, trust
contracts relying on gift exchange can outperform explicit contracts as Fehr
et al. (Forthcoming) show in their laboratory experiments.
However more recently, critical voices have emerged questioning to what
extent this lab evidence can be generalized to actual labor markets.2 Gneezy
and List (2006) (henceforth GL) investigate the robustness of positive reci-
procity, speci￿cally with respect to one crucial aspect that has previously
not been considered in lab experiments: the duration of the task. In their
natural ￿eld experiment the recruited students had to perform a data entry
or a door-to-door fund raising task. During the ￿rst few hours GL observe
a signi￿cant di￿erence in performance between their Gift treatment, where
the subjects received an unexpected increase in hourly wages, and the con-
trol treatment. These treatment e￿ects did, however, not persist and quickly
vanished. GL attribute this decrease to an adaptation after the immediate
‘hot’ phase of decision making.
1By reciprocity we refer to the psychological phenomenon of people’s (un)kind reactions
towards (un)kind actions in the absence of reputational concerns. For formal models of
reciprocity, cf. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) or Cox et al. (2005).
2Note that this is not about external validity of laboratory results in general. The
question is rather whether the usually implemented gift exchange design captures all rele-
vant features of a natural occurring work environment, see Harrison and List (2004), List
(2006), Levitt and List (2006).
3The present study is motivated by a number of recent experimental stud-
ies and surveys suggesting that reciprocal reactions are of asymmetric na-
ture. Speci￿cally, it is frequently observed that negative reciprocity is a
much stronger and more robust phenomenon than positive reciprocity.3 We
therefore hypothesize that in contrast to a wage increase, cutting wages can
have a persistent detrimental impact on work morale and e￿orts. In order to
test this hypothesis we conducted an experiment in a natural occurring work
environment. The small library of an economic chair at a German University
had to be catalogued, and we thus had the opportunity to implement a de-
sign which closely followed GL’s library task. We hired students to catalogue
the books of the library for a limited time duration of six hours at an an-
nounced hourly wage of presumably 15 Euros - the amount actually paid out
in our benchmark treatment. In our main treatment, we triggered negative
reciprocity by telling them, right before they started to work, that we would
pay them only 10 Euro per hour. While this treatment complements the
work of GL4, we additionally ran a positive reciprocity treatment (by paying
subjects 20 instead of 15 Euros per hour) for the purpose of replicating GL’s
results. Since we were especially interested in the duration of the e￿ects,
after six hours of work each subject was o￿ered to work an additional hour
for 15 Euro (irrespective of the initial treatment).
Our results suggest that wage-cuts can have severe implications on work-
ers’ e￿ort. Moreover, during the observed period there is no signi￿cant indi-
cation that workers adapted to the lower wage over time and increased their
e￿ort relative to the benchmark treatment. On the contrary, the detrimental
e￿ect is so strong that it cannot be compensated for by setting the wages back
to their original level. Our results suggest that negative reciprocity plays an
3In the experiments conducted by Engelmann and Ortmann (2001), Pereira et al. (2006)
and O￿erman (2002) negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity. Surveying
￿rms, Bewley (1999), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) as well as Blinder and Choi (1990)
report that respondents believe e￿ort to respond more strongly to wage decreases than
to wage increases. More generally, Baumeister et al. (2001) conclude in their extensive
survey of the psychological literature that the predominance of ￿bad over good￿ may be
considered as a ￿general principle or law of psychological phenomena (p. 323)￿.
4Actually, GL even proposed exploring negative reciprocity for future research in their
epilogue.
4important role in actual labor markets. In line with GL, the evidence for
the role of positive reciprocity is less conclusive. In fact, we found even less
evidence for gift exchange in the short run.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
we describe the experimental design. Subsequently, in Sections 3 and 4, the
experimental results are described and discussed.
2 Experimental Design
In August 2006 the library of an economic chair at a German University had
to be catalogued. We took this opportunity to run a ￿eld experiment, build-
ing upon GL’s experimental design. We recruited undergraduate students
from all over the campus via posters. The announcement read that it was a
one-time job opportunity for one day (six hours) that will be paid presumably
15 Euro per hour.6 About 200 students applied during the two-months’ an-
nouncement phase. A research assistant randomly picked 30 persons out of
the list of applicants. They were invited via email and asked to con￿rm the
starting date, reminding them that the job would pay presumably 15 Euro
per hour. Upon arriving at working day, the subjects were seated in front
of a computer terminal with a table of randomly picked books beside them.
Their task was to enter into an electronic data base the books’ author(s),
title, publisher, year and ISBN number. Participants were allowed to take a
break whenever necessary. A research assistant explained the task to them,
strictly following a ￿xed protocol. Then, subjects were told their hourly wage
and started working.
We conducted three di￿erent treatments. The hourly wages paid were
15 Euro in our benchmark treatment (treatment Neutral), 20 Euro in the
positive reciprocity treatment (treatment Kind) and 10 Euro in the negative
reciprocity treatment (treatment Unkind).7 No reason was given to the sub-
5In a ￿eld experiment with a di￿erent task, Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) also do not
￿nd evidence for any form of positive reciprocity.
6The announcement said ￿presumably,￿ or ￿prospective￿ (the exact German wording
was ￿voraussichtlich￿), in order to raise appropriate expectations without cheating.
710 Euro still exceed the hourly wages usually paid to a student helper at the University
5jects about why they were paid more or less than the announced 15 Euro.
We had 10 subjects in the benchmark and negative reciprocity treatment,
and 9 subjects in the positive reciprocity treatment, since one subject did
not show up to work.
The experiment took place over a 10 days’ period, with 3 subjects per
day (one in each treatment). The subjects showed up successively at di￿erent
times and were separated from each other, in di￿erent rooms at an online
computer terminal, without being monitored.8 The computer application
in which they entered the details of the books, recorded the exact time of
each log, allowing us to exactly reconstruct the amount of books each person
entered over time and the time span between two books entered. After
6 hours elapsed, everyone had to complete a questionnaire asking (among
other things) how they perceived the task and the wage. In order to observe
them in a ‘natural work environment’, subjects were not told that they were
taking part in an experiment.
After completing the questionnaire, all subjects were asked if they were
willing to work immediately an additional hour for 15 Euros (irrespective of
their initial treatment). In case they rejected this o￿er, they were paid their
total wage and left. Otherwise, they worked one additional hour and received
their total wage payment afterwards. The data gained from the additional
hour enables us to compare the performance of a subject under di￿erent
wages. Unfortunately, only three subjects in Neutral and two subjects in
Kind, but seven subjects in Unkind agreed to work an additional hour.
of Karlsruhe, which is 7:53 Euro. We paid higher wages in the benchmark treatment, since
we wanted to focus on the e￿ect of the unexpected change rather than the absolute height
of the wage, which would otherwise have been extremely low in the Unkind treatment.
8All this was done in order to minimize the possible bias of other in￿uences, like peer
e￿ects, monitoring e￿ects, time of start or day of work. Furthermore, all subjects inter-
acted with the same research assistant to eliminate experimenter e￿ects. In order not to
induce an experimenter demand e￿ect, the research assistant did know neither the purpose
of the study nor the reason for the wage cut/rise.
63 Results
Figure 1 illustrates the average e￿ort (measured by the number of books
logged) per 90 respectively 15 minutes time intervals for the three di￿erent
treatments. Table 1 contains the average treatment e￿ects, i.e. the di￿erence
in average number of books logged, and the p-values (two sided) from the
corresponding nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the null hypoth-
esis of equal e￿ort between treatments. Over the entire period we observe a
substantial di￿erence in e￿ort between subjects in the Neutral and Unkind
treatments. This e￿ect is highly signi￿cant from a statistical and economic
point of view (see columns three and four in Table 1). On average, workers
in the Unkind treatment logged 56 (or 27 percent) books less than in the
benchmark treatment.9 Moreover, as hypothesized, and in contrast to the
￿ndings of GL for positive reciprocity, there is no indication for any adap-
tation over the observed periods (i.e. the average treatment e￿ect remains
large and signi￿cant over time)10.
Concerning positive reciprocity, the average treatment e￿ect for the wage
increase is marginally small during the ￿rst 90 minutes’ period. Only between
minutes 181 and 270 we ￿nd an e￿ect which is signi￿cant at a 10 percent
level (see column two of Table 1). In line with the results of GL, there is only
weak support for the existence of positive reciprocity; in fact, we do not even
￿nd much evidence for gift exchange in the short run. Workers provided on
average 10 percent more e￿ort (or logged 21 more books) due to the wage
increase. This di￿erence is statistically not signi￿cant and less than half of
the absolute magnitude of the discrepancy between the treatments Unkind
and Neutral.
9For the chosen calibration the average costs per book logged do not di￿er signi￿cantly
between the treatments Unkind (0.43 Euro) and Neutral (0.44 Euro). Our attention is
focused on the impact of wages on e￿ort, since any statements about e￿ciency would
arbitrarily depend on the chosen parameters.
10Alternatively, one could de￿ne adaptation as the di￿erence between the number of
books entered in the ￿rst and the last 90 minutes. In this sense, the neutral treatment has a
roughly 14% increase whereas the unkind treatment has a roughly 30% increase, suggesting
that there might be convergence as in GL. We are grateful to John List for pointing this
out. However, the null hypothesis of equal di￿erences between the treatments Unkind and
Neutral cannot be rejected using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p=0.45).
7The regression results in Table 2 are very much in line with the preceding
nonparametric analysis. In column (1) we use the same linear Random E￿ects
model speci￿cation as GL and add an indicator for the Unkind treatment and
the corresponding interaction terms with the Timet dummies. The coe￿cient
for Unkind is highly signi￿cant whereas the one for Kind does not reach
any conventional signi￿cance level. Moreover, all of the Unkind ¤ Timet
interaction e￿ects are insigni￿cant, suggesting that there was no adaptation
over the observed period. On the other hand, as indicated by the estimated
Kind ¤ Timet coe￿cients, the e￿ect of Kind is signi￿cantly higher after the
￿rst 90 minutes elapsed.11 A further interesting result - which is also clearly
visible in Figure 1 - is that the number of books logged increased substantially
over time, which we interpret as a learning e￿ect. As reported in column (2)
all results discussed so far are robust if higher frequency data - consisting of
15 minutes time intervals - is12 used.13; 14
In addition to the e￿ect on the quantity of e￿ort, we also investigated
the impact of our treatments on the quality of e￿ort. Following the method
of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) we measured the quality of output by the
ratio of faultless logs to the total number of books entered.15 We found that
our treatments had no signi￿cant impact on the quality of the e￿ort provided
(see last column in Table 3).16 The regression results in column (3) of Table 2
11Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that all Kind ¤ Timet interaction e￿ects are equal
to zero cannot be rejected (Wald test Â2 = 5:70 Prob > Â2 = 0:1271).
12￿Is￿ or ￿are￿ depending on the background knowledge of Latin.
13Note that we have chosen an alternative speci￿cation for the higher frequency data in
order to avoid the large number of coe￿cients that would have resulted if we used dummy
variables. Instead of the Timet dummies we constructed the variable Time which takes
values from 1 to 24 indicating the time period.
14As an alternative to the random e￿ects Generalized Least Squares regression we also
ran all regressions using OLS with clustered standard errors. The coe￿cient estimates
for Kind ¤ Time3 (p=0.126), Kind ¤ Time4 (p=0.141) and - using 15 minutes intervals -
Kind¤Time (p=0.156) become insigni￿cant. All other results remain unchanged in terms
of signi￿cance and magnitude.
15Our measure of quality accounts for spelling mistakes in the titles of the books. Two
research assistants searched for errors in the titles by running an automatic spell checking
program.
16Using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
equal output quality between Kind and Neutral (p=0.624) as well as Unkind and Neutral
(p=0.7624).
8demonstrate that our main results are robust if we use only error-free entries
as our measure of workers’ e￿ort.
After the course of the regular working time subjects were o￿ered the
opportunity to work one additional hour for 15 Euros.17 This allows us to
test whether the detrimental impact of the wage-cut on e￿ort can be o￿set
by a subsequent wage increase. During the last 60 minutes of the regular
working time the workers in the Unkind treatment logged on average 29.6
books. Even though the hourly wage was increased by 50 percent, back to
15 Euros, the average e￿ort level remained unchanged at 28.3 books logged
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z=0.170 and p > jzj = 0:865). The ine￿ective-
ness of the wage increase is unlikely the result of exhaustion, since subjects
in the treatments Kind and Neutral logged in on average 43.6 books, which
is according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 2:847 p > jzj = 0:004) signif-
icantly more.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Summarizing, we ￿nd that wage-cuts have severe implications on workers’
e￿ort. Moreover, during the observed period there is no signi￿cant indica-
tion that workers adapted to the lower wage over time. On the contrary, the
detrimental e￿ect is so strong that it cannot be compensated for by setting
the wages back to their original level. While these results are broadly sup-
portive for the notion of negative reciprocity in labor markets, the evidence
for positive reciprocity is less conclusive. In line with GL we do not ￿nd a
signi￿cant positive relationship between higher wages and e￿ort, not even
in the short run.18 The response of e￿ort to the higher wage is lagged and
17Only few subjects were willing to work for an additional hour in the treatments Kind
(N=3) and Neutral (N=2). Therefore, in the following we only consider the 7 subjects
that agreed to work for an additional hour in the Unkind treatment.
18If one de￿nes e￿ort in GL’s fundraising task as number of households approached
rather than amount of dollar raised, which seems in some sense more appropriate, there
is also no indication of positive reciprocity at all, not even in the short run (cf. Footnote
9 in GL).
9about half the magnitude of the response to a wage reduction of the same
size.19 The quality of workers’ output does not signi￿cantly di￿er between
all of our treatments.
At least three potential reasons might have caused the observed di￿er-
ences between GL’s and our results concerning the e￿ect in the short run.
First, the wage increase implemented by GL (66 percent) was - in relative
terms - twice as large as ours (33 percent) and consequently might have been
evaluated more positively. Second, as mentioned above the hourly wage of-
fered in Neutral (15 Euros) was well above the usually paid 7.53 Euros for
student helpers. Thus, subjects could have already perceived 15 Euros as
a generous o￿er and provided an above average e￿ort. In fact, the num-
ber of books logged during the ￿rst 90 minutes in our Neutral treatment
(49.7 books) is nearly identical to the e￿ort provided in GL’s Gift treatment
(51.7 books). Finally, and related to this, the results for the Kind treatment
might have been a￿ected by a ceiling e￿ect. If an average of 50 books per 90
minutes corresponds to the physical limit for unexperienced subjects, even
an increased e￿ort in Kind could have not resulted in a higher measurable
output than in Neutral. Only due to the learning e￿ect the workers in Kind
were able to gradually increase their output. Note that all potential expla-
nations are related to the actual parametrization of the experiment. This
highlights that future research, both in the ￿eld and in the lab, should take
issues related to parametrization very seriously.20
Our most striking ￿nding is the asymmetry between positive and nega-
tive reciprocity in our data. The result from this experiment, that negative
reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity, is in line with previous ev-
idence from surveys and lab experiments. Campbell and Kamlani (1997),
for instance, explore the reasons for wage rigidity and survey wage setting
19In related work, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2006) also ￿nd that the positive relationship be-
tween higher wages and e￿ort (in a di￿erent task) occurs with a time lag. On the other
hand, MarØchal and Th￿ni (2006) ￿nd evidence for immediate positive reciprocal reactions
in a natural ￿eld experiment with sales representatives.
20In the taxonomy proposed by Engelmann and Ortmann (2001) the sensitivity of the
results towards parametrization is called ￿￿rst-degree robustness￿. See also Fehr et al.
(2002), Rigdon (2002) or Pereira et al. (2006) for ￿rst-degree robustness checks of gift
exchange in the lab.
10individuals from 184 ￿rms. They ￿nd that the ￿respondents expected that
the e￿ect of wages on e￿ort would be strongly asymmetric (p. 778)￿ in the
sense that e￿ort is more sensitive to wage-cuts than to wage increases. This
point was also put forth by Bewley (1999) and Blinder and Choi (1990). In a
lab experiment, O￿erman (2002) comes to the same conclusion showing that
negative reciprocity as a reaction to intentionally hurtful behavior is substan-
tively more frequent than positive reciprocal reactions to helpful behavior.21
O￿erman suggests that a self serving bias might be a potential reason for the
observed asymmetry. A kind deed ￿ts ￿...very well in people’s positive view of
themselves and is no reason for surprise.￿ By contrast, intentionally unkind
actions are ￿...in sharp con￿ict with the positive self-image of the individual
(p. 1435).￿ Campbell and Kamlani (1997), on the other hand, consider loss
aversion (i.e. the tendency to value losses more than gains22) as a potential
explanation for the phenomenon.
Our results provide some suggestive evidence for negative reciprocal mo-
tivations as a determinant of downward wage rigidity. It seems worthwhile to
asses the robustness of this e￿ect of negative reciprocity in future research.
Three aspects appear to be especially important. First, our time horizon is
limited to one day of work. Extending the time horizon and testing for the
robustness of our results is consequently an important next step. Secondly,
we avoided to communicate any reasons for the changes in hourly wages.
However, the evidence from ￿rm surveys is broadly conclusive that wage-
cuts are expected to have a higher acceptance among the workers if they
are necessary to prevent bankruptcy and large scale dismissals.23 Hence, the
framing of wage-cuts will probably play an important role. And ￿nally, if
workers su￿er from nominal illusion, real wage-cuts - by increasing nominal
wages at a lower rate than in￿ation - are more likely to be possible without
incurring the risk of a detrimental e￿ect on work morale.24
21For further consonant evidence in laboratory experiments, see Brandts and Charness
(1999), Engelmann and Ortmann (2001) or Th￿ni and G￿chter (2006).
22See Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
23See Kaufman (1984), Kahneman et al. (1986), Blinder and Choi (1990) Campbell and
Kamlani (1997) or Bewley (1999).
24See Kahneman et al. (1986), Blinder and Choi (1990) or Agell and Bennmarker (2004).
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90 180 270 360
Minutes
Unkind Neutral
KindTable 1: Average Treatment E￿ects by Timeunits: # Books Logged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time interval Kind - Neutral p > jzj Unkind - Neutral p > jzj
Minutes 1-90 0.1 0.623 -16.3 0.002
Minutes 91-180 6.4 0.164 -13.7 0.010
Minutes 181-270 6.7 0.094 -12.9 0.006
Minutes 270-360 7.7 0.347 -13.3 0.017
Total regular time 20.9 0.165 -56.2 0.003
Note: Columns 1 and 3 report Average Treatment E￿ect estimates for the treatments
Kind (20 Euros hourly wage) and Unkind (10 Euros hourly wage) in comparison with the
benchmark Neutral (15 Euros hourly wage) for the di￿erent time intervals. The outcome
variable is the number of books logged as a measure for the e￿ort provided. Columns
2 and 4 report the corresponding p-values from a nonparametric (two-sided) Wilcoxon
rank-sum test for the null hypothesis of equal e￿ort between treatments.Table 2: Panel Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Number of books 90 minutes intervals 15 minutes intervals Faultless logs
logged Coe￿./Rob.se Coe￿./Rob.se Coe￿./Rob.se
Kind 0.078 0.029 1.544
(4.670) (0.728) (4.611)








Kind ¤ Time2 6.289** 4.833
(3.069) (3.312)
Kind ¤ Time3 6.633** 4.356
(3.356) (3.330)
Kind ¤ Time4 7.667* 1.722
(4.491) (4.636)
Unkind ¤ Time2 2.600 2.900
(3.766) (4.106)
Unkind ¤ Time3 3.400 2.600
(3.836) (3.836)




Kind ¤ Time 0.067**
(0.031)
Unkind ¤ Time 0.026
(0.027)
Constant 49.700*** 8.040*** 45.900***
(3.681) (0.591) (3.829)
Obs. 116 696 116
R2 0.429 0.250 0.387
Wald Â2 1011.9 72.7 952.5
Prob> Â2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The table reports GLS coe￿cient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses)
from a linear Random E￿ects model. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the
number of books logged per time interval. In column (3) the dependent measure is the
number of faultlessly logged books per 90 minutes time interval. The treatment dummies
Unkind (10 Euros hourly wage) and Kind (20 Euros hourly wage) are interacted with
the time interval dummies Timet (or the variable Time which takes values from 1 to
24 in the high frequency data). In column one Neutral (15 Euros hourly wage), Time1,
Kind ¤ Time1 and Unkind ¤ Time1 are considered as reference categories. Signi￿cance
levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.T
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